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The remarkable predictive performance of deep neural networks (DNNs) has led to their adoption in service
domains of unprecedented scale and scope. However, the widespread adoption and growing commercialization
of DNNs have underscored the importance of intellectual property (IP) protection. Devising techniques to
ensure IP protection has become necessary due to the increasing trend of outsourcing the DNN computations
on the untrusted accelerators in cloud-based services. The design methodologies and hyper-parameters
of DNNs are crucial information, and leaking them may cause massive economic loss to the organization.
Furthermore, the knowledge of DNN’s architecture can increase the success probability of an adversarial
attack where an adversary perturbs the inputs and alter the prediction.
In this work, we devise a two-stage attack methodology “DeepPeep” which exploits the distinctive charac-
teristics of design methodologies to reverse-engineer the architecture of building blocks in compact DNNs.
We show the efficacy of “DeepPeep” on P100 and P4000 GPUs. Additionally, we propose intelligent design
maneuvering strategies for thwarting IP theft through the DeepPeep attack and proposed “Secure MobileNet-
V1”. Interestingly, compared to vanilla MobileNet-V1, secure MobileNet-V1 provides a significant reduction
in inference latency (≈60%) and improvement in predictive performance (≈2%) with very-low memory and
computation overheads.
CCS Concepts: • Computing methodologies→ Deep Neural Networks; • Security and privacy→ Soft-
ware and application security;
Additional Key Words and Phrases: Deep neural networks, Intellectual property, Side-channel attacks
1 INTRODUCTION
Deep neural networks (DNNs) provide high accuracy on cognitive tasks, and hence, they are
now spreading their wings to new mission-critical domains such as health care, defense, financial
sector, unmanned aerial vehicles, and autonomous driving. The global revenue generated from the
deployment and commercialization of artificial intelligence is forecast to increase from $9.5 billion
in 2018 to $118.6 billion by 2025 [2]. This makes DNN models a crucial intellectual property (IP) for
the service providers. The IP of a DNN consists of the design methodologies employed in DNNs
along with the architectural hyper-parameters (e.g., number of the filters in a layer, depth of the
network, and filter size). A malicious entity who can access this information can counterfeit the IP.
Further, the knowledge of DNN’s architecture increases the success probability of adversarial attacks
[29, 34]. Several other attacks, such as membership inference attacks [30, 38], model extraction
attack [43], hyper-parameter stealing attack [44], and others, also rely on the knowledge of DNN’s
architecture. In other words, knowledge of DNN architecture allows an adversary to launch the
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attacks mentioned above. These attacks can have disastrous consequences, especially in security-
critical domains, such as banking and the stock market, and mission-critical domains, such as
self-driving cars and robot-assisted surgery. These trends and factors have underscored the importance
of keeping the DNN model confidential.
The training phase of computations in DNNs requires massive compute and memory resources
[4], and hence, DNN training is outsourced to the cloud services [8, 20, 32]. Further, to cope with
the uncertainties and dynamic nature of the real-world environment, the cognitive applications
deployed at the edge, such as self-driving cars and drones, share a massive amount of data with the
cloud and frequently update the deployed models and policies [21]. However, the low compute and
storage capability, slower hardware/software update cycles, and extreme heterogeneity in edge
devices make them unsuitable for continual and shared learning [39]. These factors necessitate the
DNN computation on public clouds, which widen the exposure of DNNs to attacks.
GPUs have massive computing capability and are suitable for training DNNs on large datasets
[36]. Therefore, GPUs have been widely adopted by cloud service providers [20, 32] for DNN
computations on the public clouds. Also, desktop-scale GPUs and mobile GPUs have been used for
inference on autonomous vehicles. Unlike trusted execution environments such as Intel’s “soft-
ware guard extensions” (SGX) [6], ARM’s TrustZone [54] and Sanctum [7], GPUs do not provide
hardware/software isolation and hence, do not guarantee a trusted execution environment [33].
However, the aforementioned trusted execution environments suffer from performance degra-
dation compared to the untrusted accelerators such as GPU [42]. Therefore, outsourcing DNN’s
computation on untrusted accelerators in public clouds increases the attack surface. Hence, there
is a crucial need to study DNN design methodologies and its robustness to side-channel attacks for
preventing DNN IP theft.
Recent research trends in DNN design have mainly focused on four aspects of the network, viz.,
depth [11], width [52], cardinality [48], and attention [46]. These aspects of network design have
been employed for either (1) improving the representational power of the network with additional
computation and parameter overhead, or (2) reducing the computation and parameter overheads
without sacrificing the predictive performance of the network. However, the security aspect of
network design, i.e., the robustness of design methodologies from IP counterfeiting standpoint, has
been ignored.
In this paper, we ask a crucial question: how vulnerable are the design methodologies of DNNs to
side-channel attacks, and what is the minimum information adversaries need for counterfeiting the
design IP? To answer this question, we systematically and meticulously review the architecture of
prominent compact DNNs and investigate the feasibility of deciphering the backbone architecture
of compact DNNs through side-channels attacks. Through our thorough analysis, we found that
the compact DNNs [9, 12, 16, 31, 37, 53] are designed by repeatedly connecting few architectural
building blocks which makes their design regular and modular and also reduces the number of
design hyper-parameters. However, due to this, compact DNNs exhibit distinguishing properties in
terms of the memory footprint, inference time, energy consumption, and resource utilization. These
unique properties can easily be exploited by adversaries to infer the architecture of compact DNNs.
Thus, we show that the existing approaches to designing compact DNNs have crucial security
vulnerabilities. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first work that investigates the security
aspect of designing compact DNNs from the IP theft standpoint. We summarize our contributions as
follows.
• We analyze the architectural implications of designing compact DNNs. This analysis reveals
distinguishing characteristics of different design methodologies, which can be used by an
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adversary to decipher the employed design methodologies such as building blocks in compact
DNNs (Section 3).
• We explore security aspects of designing compact DNNs and investigate the robustness of
state-of-the-art design methodologies against design IP theft using various side-channel
attacks (Section 3 and Section 4).
• We propose a two-stage black-box attack methodology termed “DeepPeep”, (Figure 1) which
can be used by an adversary to decipher the architectural building blocks of a compact
DNN based on its distinctive characteristics (Section 5). We present experimental results of
“DeepPeep” on state-of-the-art compact DNNs on two GPUs (P100 and P4000).
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Fig. 1. DeepPeep attack model
• Wepropose a “secureMobileNet-V1” architecture, which is robust against the attack “DeepPeep”
and prevents the IP theft. Compared to baseline MobileNet-V1, secure MobileNet-V1 achieves
a 60.65% reduction in inference time and, most importantly, there is a ≈2% improvement in
top-1 accuracy on both the ImageNet-1K and CIFAR-100 image classification datasets. We
also provide generic design recommendations for security-aware DNN design in Section 6.
• We explain the generality and applicability of our proposed attack methodology “DeepPeep”
on different model architectures, hardware platforms, and datasets (Section 7).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we define performance metrics and
other terminologies used in this paper and provide a detailed explanation for experimental setup
and methodology. In section 3, we describe the building blocks in state-of-the-art compact DNNs
along with their distinctive properties in terms of the percentage of cuBLAS kernels. We explore
the various avenues for side-channel attacks to gain insights into the architecture of compact
DNNs in section 4. We describe our proposed black-box attack mechanism DeepPeep in section 5.
In section 6, we present the defense mechanism to thwart the side-channel attacks and provide
recommendations for security-aware DNN design. The generality and applicability of “DeepPeep”
on different DNN architectures, hardware platforms, and datasets have been investigated in section
7. We discuss the machine-learning-based approach for deciphering the architecture of DNN and
their demerits in section 8. In section 9, we present the related works on DNN security. Finally, we
conclude with future work in section 10.
2 PRELIMINARIES
Table 1 shows the symbols used in this paper. Here, FPS is frames per second, ifmaps is input
feature maps, ofmap is output feature maps, and GMACs is 109 × #MACs .
2.1 Metrics and Terminologies
The metrics of interest are computed, as shown in the following equations. For these computations,
we assume (1) spatial dimensions (height and width) of ifmaps are equal (2) spatial dimensions
of ofmaps are the same, and (3) spatial dimensions of filters are equal. Note that the number of
channels in the filter is equal toM , and the number of filters is equal to N .
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Table 1. Symbols used in this paper
Quantity (symbol) Unit Quantity (symbol) Unit
#MACs (Mc ) Millions Memory-footprint (Mf p ) MiB
#Parameters (P ) Millions Forward-pass time (FPt ) milliseconds
#Activations (A) Millions Backward-pass time (BPt ) milliseconds
Energy per frame (EPF) millijoule Model-size (Ms ) MiB
Batch size (B) - Energy efficiency (Ee ) GMACs/Joule
Throughput(Tp ) FPS width/height of ifmaps (SM ) -
#ifmaps (M) - width/height of ofmaps (SN ) -
#ofmaps (N ) - width/height of filter (SF ) -
# Parameters = N ×M × S2F (1)
# Activations = N × S2N (2)
# MACs = N ×M × S2N × S2F (3)
Energy per frame = (Average power) × (FPt ) (4)
Energy efficiency = PerformancePower
=
B ×Mc
Energy per frame (5)
Memory-footprint: It depends on the maximum concurrent data at runtime, which includes
(1) the total number of parameters, (2) concurrent activations and (3) gradients corresponding to
activations and parameters. In other words, the memory-footprint depends on both the number of
parameters and the number of activations. By comparison, model size depends only on the number
of parameters in DNN. The correlation between the number of parameters and the number of
activations entirely depends on the architecture of DNNs [17]. That is, there is no direct correlation
between model size and memory-footprint.
Degree of data reuse: It is defined as the number of arithmetic-operations per unit of operand
fetched from different levels in memory-hierarchy. In convolutional layers, the arithmetic operations
(MACs) have two types of operands, viz., filter-parameters, and input activations. This operation
is shown in Figure 2. Hence, we express the degree of data reuse in terms of weight reuse (McW )
and activation reuse (McA ). Note that the partial sum (Figure 2) is not a different type of operand;
instead, it is expressed in terms of filter-weights and input-activations.
Energy per frame: EPF an amount of energy consumed in one forward pass through the entire
network with a fixed spatial size image (Eqn. 4). It depends on both the number of MACs operation
and the energy-efficiency of DNN. Since energy-efficiency depends on the degree of data reuse,
DNN with lower computational complexity, and poor data reuse exhibits higher EPF . Note that the
number of MAC operations depends on the number of layers, shape/size of each layer, and types of
convolution employed in the network. Thus, EPF varies quite significantly across different DNNs.
2.2 Experimental Setup
For our experiments, we use Caffe framework [19] and run the DNNs on Tesla P100-PCIE-12GB and
Quadro P4000 GPUs. The former is a high-end data center scale GPU, and the latter is a desktop GPU.
Hence, these GPUs have significantly different compute, bandwidth, and memory resources (Table
4
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Fig. 2. Illustration of a MAC operation.
2). Since GPUs have an ample amount of computing capability and memory resources, performing
the experiments on GPUs allows analyzing the characteristics of DNN’s design methodologies
without getting bottlenecked by system resources. This capability is especially useful at larger
batch sizes.
Table 2. Configuration of GPUs used in our experiments
GPU # SMs # core Global memory (MB) Peak bandwidth (GB/s) Peak Tp (TFLOPS) TDP (watts)
P100 56 3584 12193 549 9.3 250
P4000 14 1792 8118 243 5.2 105
Power measurement on GPU: We use an inbuilt nvidia-smi utility to measure the power
on Nvidia’s GPUs. Since nvidia-smi is a high-level utility and sampling rate depends on that of
the inbuilt power sensor in GPU [5], accurately measuring the power consumption on GPU is a
non-trivial task and requires extra care. The inbuilt sensor’s sampling rate is not only quite low
but also GPU specific, i.e., varies from GPU to GPU. For instance, on P100 and P4000 GPUs, the
sampling rate is ≈ 50Hz and ≈ 1Hz, respectively. To circumvent the challenge mentioned above, we
run DNNs for a higher number of iterations (forward pass and backward pass simultaneously) and
get the stabilized power readings. More precisely, at batch size one, we run 500 iterations for DNNs
with lower inference time (e.g., SqueezeNet and GoogLeNet), and 100 iterations for the DNNs with
higher inference time. Note that at larger batch sizes, we run the same number of iterations for all
the DNNs (in Table 3). Similar to [47], we sample the readings of nvidia-smi tool at every 0.1 ms,
and once the power reading becomes stable, we take the average power (reported by nvidia-smi) as
the power consumption of a DNN.
Similarly, as above, we take an average over a large number of iterations for forward and
backward propagation time (FPt and BPt respectively) while running DNN in Caffe [19] deep
learning framework. This way, we increase the robustness and mitigate the effect of noise on the
readings. Memory-footprintMf p is measured as the global memory occupied in GPU during the
DNN computation in Caffe. Further, to know the distinctive properties of different building blocks
in compact DNNs and gain more insights about the architectural ingredients of basic building
blocks in all the compact DNNs, we have conducted experiments with various batch sizes (B). We
take B as either the power of two or the integer multiples of the number of streaming processors
(SMs) in GPUs. For example, on P100 GPU, we take B as 1, 4, 8, 16, 32, and 56, whereas on P4000
GPU, we take B as 1, 4, 8, 14, and 28 1
1On GPUs P100 and P4000, MobileNet-V2 and DenseNet are not able to run with higher B (such as B = 28,56) due to their
high memory-footprint.
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3 DISTINCTIVE PROPERTIES OF BUILDING BLOCKS IN COMPACT DNNS
In this section, we first discuss the architectural building blocks in compact DNNs, such as fire
module, inceptionmodule, dense block, alongwith their fine-grained architectural components, such
as branching and residual/skip connections. (Table 3). This analysis of architectural ingredients
in compact DNNs would help in reverse engineer the basic building blocks in compact DNNs
through the side-channel attacks. Then, we show the GPU kernel (cuBLAS) profiling results for
all the compact DNNs listed in Table 3. We then analyze the properties of these cuBLAS kernels,
which would help decipher the fine-grained architectural components present in building blocks of
compact DNNs.
3.1 Architectural Building Blocks in Compact DNNs
Most compact DNN designs employ a single building block in a repeated manner to reduce the
number of design hyper-parameter choices and make design optimization easier. Also, it makes
DNN’s design more regular and modular. These basic building blocks in compact DNNs can be
broadly categorized as fire module, depthwise convolution (DWConv), channel shuffling, dense
block, and inception module (Table 3). For example, SqueezeNet and SqueezeNext use the fire
module, whereas MobileNet and ShuffleNet DNNs use DWConv.
Table 3. DNN groups with similar architectural building blocks. In each group, the DNN shown in bold is the
reference DNN for our experiments.
DNN group Model Name Firemodule DWConv
Channel
shuffling
Dense
block
Inception
module PWConv Branching
Residual/skip
connections
Asymmetric filter
decomposition
SqueezeNet SqueezeNet-V1.0 [16] ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗SqueezeNet-V1.1 [16] ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗
SqueezeNext
1.0-G-SqNxt-23 [9] ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
1.0-SqNxt-23 [9] ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
1.0-SqNxt-23v5 [9] ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
2.0-SqNxt-23 [9] ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
2.0-SqNxt-23v5 [9] ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
MobileNet MobileNet-V1 [12] ✗ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗MobileNet-V2 [37] ✗ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✗
ShuffleNet ShuffleNet-V1 [53] ✗ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗ShuffleNet-V2 [31] ✗ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗
DenseNet DenseNet-121 [15] ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✗
InceptionNet
GoogLeNet [40] ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗
Inception-V2 [41] ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓
SE-BN-Inception [13] ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
The building-blocks mentioned above in compact DNNs are made up of fine-grained architectural
ingredients illustrated in the last four columns of Table 3. For example, dense blocks have skip
connections, whereas the fire module in SqueezeNet has pointwise convolution (PWConv) and
branching. We notice that building blocks in compact DNNs share standard fine-grained architectural
components, but they are arranged in a different manner. Thus, our intuition is, these basic blocks
would exhibit the distinctive characteristics which can be exploited by an adversary to reverse
engineer the architecture of these basic blocks.
3.2 Analysis of GPU Profiling Results
To understand the effect of architectural building blocks on GPU’s compute and memory resource
utilization, we perform kernel-level profiling using nvprof on P100 GPU. We analyze three cuBLAS
kernels Gemmk1, Gemv2T and Gemv2N because these kernels are present in all the compact DNNs
listed in Table 3, except SqueezeNet variants. The percentage contribution of the aforementioned
cuBLAS kernels in one iteration of forward and backward pass (successively) is shown in Table 4.
We use Nvidia visual profiler to analyze the performance bottleneck and resource utilization by
individual cuBLAS kernels. The contribution of memory dependency and instruction dependency in
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Table 4. The contribution (in %) of cuBLAS kernels in one iteration of forward and backward pass successively.
Model Name Gemv2T(%) Gemv2N(%) Gemmk1(%)
SqueezeNet-V1.0 0 0 0
SqueezeNet-V1.1 0 0 0
1.0-G-SqNxt-23 34.53 5.33 9.13
1.0-SqNxt-23 36.53 5.64 9.66
1.0-SqNxt-23v5 27.78 6.35 10.85
2.0-SqNxt-23 30.65 4.75 8.25
2.0-SqNxt-23v5 21.49 4.94 8.35
MobileNet-V1 59.23 30.55 0.63
MobileNet-V2 60.31 28.79 0.80
ShuffleNet-V1 45.37 29.50 4.39
ShuffleNet-V2 43.81 30.58 3.39
DenseNet-121 18.19 3.66 7.32
GoogLeNet 0.18 0.18 0.05
Inception-V2 5.12 0.03 3.69
SE-BN-Inception 5.75 0.03 3.35
the total stall in cuBLAS kernels are shown in Table 5. Also, the SM utilization during the execution
of cuBLAS kernels is shown in Figure 3.
Stalls in cuBLAS kernels:As shown in Table 5, the contribution of memory dependency in total
stalls in Gemmk1 and Gemv2T kernels are 54.4% and 44.3% respectively and hence, both these kernels
are memory bound. Similarly, 56.9% stalls in kernel Gemv2N are due to instruction dependency, and
hence, Gemv2N is instruction bound. The performance of memory-bound kernels can be boosted
by increasing the data-level parallelism, such as increasing the B. Whereas, the performance of
instruction-bound kernel can be increased only by introducing more instruction-level parallelism.
Hence, unlike Gemv2N, the poor SM utilization of Gemv2T kernel can be improved with larger B.
In other words, the SM utilization of DNNs with a higher percentage of Gemv2T kernel can be
improved using a larger B. By contrast, SM utilization of DNNs with a higher percentage of Gemv2N
kernel cannot be improved even at a higher B.
Table 5. Analysis of kernel properties
Attributes/stall reasons Gemmk1 Gemv2T Gemv2N
Memory dependency (%) 54.4 44.3 3.6
SM utilization Excellent Poor Very poor
Analysis: Gemm (general matrix-matrix multiplication) is a dense matrix computation kernel and
hence, it is compute intensive and memory efficient [26]. By comparison, Gemv (general matrix-vector
multiplication) is a sparse matrix computation kernel and hence, it is bandwidth limited and memory
inefficient [26]. In effect, Gemm computation has better data reuse and also, it is faster than Gemv
computation [24]. The Gemmk1 kernel is a variant of Gemm kernel, whereas Gemv2T and Gemv2N
kernels are variant of Gemv kernel.
As shown in Figure 3, the Gemmk1 kernel computations result in uniform and better SM utilization
while Gemv2T and Gemv2N kernel computations have very poor SM utilization. In fact, the poor data
layout in Gemv2N kernel [3] renders all the SM underutilized, except one. Therefore, DNNs with
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(a) Gemmk1 (b) Gemv2T
(c) Gemv2N
Fig. 3. Utilization of SMs on P100 GPU by cuBLAS kernels Gemmk1, Gemv2T, and Gemv2N
higher percentage of Gemmk1 kernel have better resource utilization compared to DNNs with higher
percentage of Gemv2T and Gemv2N kernels. This analysis of cuBLAS kernels and the understanding of
their performance in terms of resource utilization facilitates “timing side-channel attack” (Section 4).
4 SIDE-CHANNEL ATTACK MODELING
In this section, we first present the threat model and our assumptions, for the attack on compact
DNNs. We discuss the essence of predicting only the parametric layers in the building blocks of
compact DNNs. Then, we describe the side-channel attacks used in “DeepPeep” attack model.
Threat Model and assumptions: We assume that either the cloud service provider itself is
malicious, or the third parties who are running their models on the same cloud are illegitimately
trying to gain information about other models. We assume our attack methodology as a black-box
setting where the structure and the internal states (such asW , A, andMc ) of DNNs running on the
cloud are invisible to the adversary. The performance metrics which are known to adversary are
listed in Table 6. Our threat model is shown in Figure 4.
Table 6. Assumption on adversary’s knowledge
Known states/quantities Unknown states/quantities
FPt , BPt ,Mf p , power and energy consumption of DNNs, nvprof output W , A,Mc , depth of DNNs, building blocks, (Table 3).
Validity of our assumptions: To meet the growing need for running DNN computations
on public cloud, the cloud service providers use a distributed set of servers shared with other
competitors where one cloud providers can not control others [39]. The complexity of software
stack is growing to allow the running applications to leverage tools such as DNN frameworks,
data processing frameworks, and log ingestion. Hence, a security hole in even one component of
these complex software stacks or distributed execution environments can compromise the DNN
application. Furthermore, in contrast to the white-box attack where the target DNN model is visible
to the adversary, the black-box attack is more realistic in a real-world scenario. However, to make
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Fig. 4. Threat model: DNN training is outsourced to public cloud where malicious entities try to decipher the
architecture of DNN through side-channel attacks.
a black-box attack feasible, the adversary will need to make more queries (than required in a
white-box attack) through side-channel attacks.
Do we need to predict non-convolutional layers also? In our proposed attack methodology
“DeepPeep”, we intend to predict the architecture of principle building blocks in terms of their
architectural ingredients. We do not predict fully connected (FC) layers and other non-convolutional
layers such as ReLU, pooling, batch normalization layers. There are three reasons for this. First,
except for FC, all layers are non-parametric, and there are no weights/parameters to be updated
(learned) during the training of DNNs. That is, these layers do not encode any information about
the inputs. Second, the position of these layers in DNN is well-known and fixed in almost all state-
of-the-art DNN. For instance, all the DNNs employ either a global average pooling layer or an FC
layer as the last layer (before the softmax layer). Similarly, the position of other non-convolutional
layers, between two consecutive parametric layers (convolutional/FC), is well-known. Third, unlike
convolutional layers, these layers are not a determinant of internal representation in DNN. In
summary, there is no IP associated with these layers, and hence, there is no need to predict the
presence of non-convolutional layers.
We now discuss the side-channel attack modeling in the proposed attack model “DeepPeep”.
These side-channel attacks exploit the distinctive characteristics of building blocks and other
fine-grained architectural components. In other words, these attacks are based on our systematic
study on (1) the effect of architectural components on performance metricsMf p , Ee , Tp , and (2) the
percentage of cuBLAS kernels in DNNs.
4.1 Memory Side-channel Attack
This attack is based on the understanding of the effect of DNN’s architectural components, such as
basic building blocks and other fine-grained architectural ingredients, on total memory-footprint
(Mf p ).Mf p has a strong dependence on A, which in turn depends on both the network topology
(linear and non-linear) and type of operations (DWConv, PWConv, and others) [17, 24]. In linear
networks, such as AlexNet and VGGNet, layers are sequentially connected only to their immediate
neighboring layers. By contrast, in non-linear networks, such as SqueezeNet and DenseNet, layers
are connected to multiple adjacent layers [45]. Therefore, in DNNs with non-linear network
topology, the memory-overprovisioning issue gets aggravated and results in higher Mf p [45]. This
issue becomes even more pronounced when (1) non-linear DNNs are deeper [45], and (2) non-linear
DNNs are executed at higher B [17].
Notice that SqueezeNext variants have very high AP ratio and 1.0-G-SqNxt-23 has higherMf p
(Table 7) than AlexNet even when the former has 112× fewer P than the latter (Table 8) . The
fire module in SqueezeNext has all the fine-grained architectural components listed in last four
columns in Table 3 which renders AP ratio very high. As shown in Figure 5(a) and 5(c), the increase
inMf p with B for all the compact DNNs is substantially high compared to that in AlexNet. In fact,
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in DenseNet,Mf p increases exponentially with B because the number of skip connections in dense
blocks vary exponentially with the number of layers [15].
Table 7. All the values are measured on P100 GPU. Tp is measured at the batch size shown in parenthesis.
Model Name FPt Mf p Ee Tp(B = 1) (B = 1) (B = 4)
AlexNet 2.1 1015 75.94 4000 (B=56)
SqueezeNet-V1.0 3.8 615 40.95 1414 (B=56)
SqueezeNet-V1.1 3.5 587 27.07 2488 (B=56)
1.0-G-SqNxt-23 24.4 1019 1.69 665 (B=56)
1.0-SqNxt-23 24.5 885 2.16 691 (B=56)
1.0-SqNxt-23v5 23.8 867 1.92 856 (B=56)
2.0-SqNxt-23 28.2 995 3.75 418 (B=56)
2.0-SqNxt-23v5 27.7 957 3.86 538 (B=56)
MobileNet-V1 29.4 733 1.65 42 (B=56)
MobileNet-V2 42.2 970 0.80 28 (B=32)
DenseNet-121 33.0 1405 8.41 164 (B=16)
GoogLeNet 11.2 801 21.95 1167 (B=56)
Inception-V2 19.0 987 14.05 602 (B=56)
Observation 1: The architectural components such as skip connections in dense blocks,
residual connection, branching, etc. lead to non-linear topology in DNNs. They also increase
A
P ratio which is greater than one for all the compact DNNs in Table 8. Further, the rate of
increase inMf p with B depends on the rate of increase in AP ratio with the depth of network
and B. This correlation between theMf p and DNN’s architecture can be exploited by an adversary
to decipher the network topology employed in compact DNNs.
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Fig. 5. Memory-footprint and BPtF Pt ratio on both P100 GPU (Figure (a) and (b) respectively) and on P4000
GPU (Figure (c) and (d) respectively)
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4.2 Timing Side-channel Attack
This attack is based on our thorough study of GPU compute resource (SM) utilizationwith increasing
B. We measure BPtF Pt ratio (Figure 5(b) and 5(d)) and Tp (Figure 6(a) and 6(c)) for all the compact
DNNs with increasing B.
Observation 2: In all the compact DNNs, BPtF Pt ratio either remains constant or increases with
B. By comparison, in AlexNet, this ratio decreases gradually with increasing B. Through this
timing side-channel attack, one can easily distinguish compact DNNs from large DNNs such as
AlexNet.
Among the compact DNNs, SqueezeNet variants (V1.0/V1.1), MobileNet variants (V1/V2), and
GoogLeNet have constant BPtF Pt ratio with increasing B. Notice that, in case of SqueezeNet variants
and GoogLeNet, BPtF Pt ratio is lower than one, however, MobileNet variants have
BPt
F Pt
ratio greater
than one.
As discussed in Section 3.2, higher percentage of Gemv2T and Gemv2N leads to poor SM utilization.
However, the latter has even worse SM utilization because of its data layout. The SqueezeNet
variants and GoogLeNet have negligible percentage of these two kernels (Table 4) and hence, BPtF Pt
ratio is lower than one and remains unaffected with increasing B. However, MobileNet variants
have both Gemv2T and Gemv2N kernel percentage substantially high (Table 4) and this leads to low
SM utilization in both forward and backward pass. Therefore, BPtF Pt ratio is greater than one for all B
in MobileNet variants. Note that during backward pass, the SM utilization properties of Gemv2T and
Gemv2N kernels get inter-changed (explained in Appendix I). That is, DNNs with higher percentage
of Gemv2T and lower percentage of Gemv2N will have better SM utilization in forward pass, but poor
SM utilization in backward pass. For the same reason, BPtF Pt ratio increases with B in all the variants
of SqueezeNext (Figure 5(b) and 5(d)).
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Fig. 6. Throughput (Tp ) and energy per frame (EPF ) on both P100 GPU (Figure (a) and (b) respectively) and
on P4000 GPU (Figure (c) and (d) respectively)
Observation 3: The increase in Tp with higher B depends on the SM utilization in forward
pass. Both MobileNet variants and ShuffleNet variants have significantly higher percentage
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of Gemv2T and Gemv2N kernels (Table 4) and hence, they have poor SM utilization in forward
pass. For the same reason, Tp remains constant for both MobileNet variants (for all B) and
ShuffleNet variants (for higher B).
Table 8. Characteristics of compact DNNs. Pnorm shows the reduction in number of parameters of a DNN
compared to AlexNet. Top-1 is the single crop image classification accuracy on ILSVRC 2012 dataset.
Model Name Image size Mc P A A/P Mc /P Mc /A Top-1 accuracy (%) Pnorm
AlexNet [23] 224 × 224 723 60.97 2.05 0.03 11.86 352.65 57.20 1×
SqueezeNet-V1.0 224 × 224 848 1.25 12.3 9.84 678.08 68.91 57.50 49×
SqueezeNet-V1.1 224 × 224 349 1.24 7.2 5.81 281.57 48.49 57.10 49×
1.0-G-SqNxt-23 224 × 224 221 0.54 17.81 32.80 406.35 12.39 57.16 112×
1.0-SqNxt-23 224 × 224 273 0.72 17.81 24.84 380.50 15.32 59.05 85×
1.0-SqNxt-23v5 224 × 224 225 0.93 14.06 15.12 242.04 16.01 59.24 66×
2.0-SqNxt-23 224 × 224 726 2.36 32.21 13.65 307.62 22.54 67.18 26×
2.0-SqNxt-23v5 224 × 224 703 3.22 24.66 7.66 218.41 28.52 67.44 19×
MobileNet-V1 224 × 224 574 4.23 20.32 4.80 135.65 28.24 70.60 14×
MobileNet-V2 224 × 224 300 3.40 35.45 10.43 88.24 8.46 72.00 18×
DenseNet-121 224 × 224 3080 7.98 69.99 8.77 385.96 44.01 75.00 8×
GoogLeNet 224 × 224 1590 7.00 10.06 1.44 227.14 158.05 71.00 9×
Inception-V2 231 × 231 2200 11.19 18.03 1.61 196.60 122.02 76.60 5×
4.3 Power Side-channel Attack
This side-channel attack is based on the understanding of EPF and its variation with B. As shown
in Equation 5, EPF depends on bothMc and energy efficiency of MAC operation (Ee ). The former
depends on DNN’s architecture and design methodologies, while the latter depends on the degree of
data reuse exploitable in the network. Further, the variation of EPF with B also depends on resource
utilization because increasing B increases data-level parallelism. As explained in Appendix I, Ee
has strong dependence on activation reuse (McA ) which is significantly low in SqueezeNext variants
and MobileNet variants (Table 8). The reason for low activation reuse in the former is the presence
of all the fine-grained architectural components which increases the concurrent activations and
reduces the effective McA . The lower activation reuse in MobileNet variants is due to the use of
DWConv and PWConv.
Observation 4: At B = 1, the EPF of SqueezeNext variants and MobileNet variants are very
high (Figure 6(b) and 6(d)) due to the aforementioned low McA . However, because of the poor
SM utilization in the MobileNet variants, EPF remains constant with increasing B (Table
4). By contrast, in SqueezeNext variants, due to better SM utilization, EPF decreases with
increasing B.
4.4 Kernels Side-channel Attack
Figure 7 shows how an adversary can decipher the fine-grained architectural components in
building blocks of compact DNNs by knowing the percentage of cuBLAS kernels Gemmk1, Gemv2T,
and Gemv2N.
When the basic building block has only branching, such as the fire module in SqueezeNet and
inception module in GoogLeNet, then the combined contribution of Gemv2T and Gemv2N is nearly
zero (Table 4). In comparison, the presence of asymmetric filter decomposition and branching,
for example, in Inception-V2 and SE-BN-Inception, cause irregular data access and computation
patterns. This results in lower SMutilization, which is substantiated by the presence of Gemv2T (≃ 5%)
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Fig. 7. Prediction steps for determining fine-grained architectural ingredients of principle building blocks
kernel (Table 4). Further, dense connections (in DenseNet) result in higher percentage contribution
of Gemv2T (≃ 20%). When the basic building block contains asymmetric filter decomposition along
with residual connections (fire module in SqueezeNext), then it leads to a very high percentage
of Gemv2T compared to Gemv2N, but both are significant. The presence of Gemv2T and Gemv2N are
significantly higher when DWConv (MobileNet variants) employed in DNNs, which renders most
of the SM under-utilized. Note that the cuBLAS library is an integral part of CUDA [3], which is
used in most of the DNN frameworks such as Caffe, PyTorch, TensorFlow, and others. Hence, the
above architectural analysis on the correlation between the fine-grained architectural components
and the percentage of cuBLAS kernels is quite generalized and distinctive. Thus, it can be used by
an adversary to predict the primary building block in DNNs.
We utilize the observations made above in both inter-group prediction and intra-group prediction
stages of the “DeepPeep” attack model (Section 5.1 and Section 5.2) to decipher the architecture of
compact DNNs.
5 PROPOSED ATTACK MODEL: DEEPPEEP
In this section, we describe our proposed two-stage attack methodology, “DeepPeep,” which exposes
the crucial security vulnerabilities present in compact DNNs due to its design principles. “DeepPeep,”
decipher the architecture of the compact DNN (termed “victim DNN”) running on GPU in a cloud.
Based on the similarity of the building block, we group the compact DNNs into six groups, as
shown in Table 3. In each group, we take one DNN as the reference, which is highlighted as bold in
Table 3. The attack proceeds in two stages:
(1) Inter-group prediction: First, the adversary finds the group of the victim DNN (Figure 8)
(2) Intra-group prediction: Once the group is known, the adversary compares the characteristics,
such as FPt , BPt , Mf p , EPF (at different B), percentage of cuBLAS kernels (Figure 7), etc.,
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of the reference DNN with the victim DNN (Figure 9). Note that the inter-group prediction
is easier than intra-group prediction because the characteristics of building blocks vary
significantly across the DNNs, while the intra-group variation is modest.
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Fig. 8. Inter-group prediction stage in DeepPeep predicts the group of victim DNNs
5.1 Inter-group Prediction in DeepPeep
Figure 8 summarizes the steps for inter-group prediction stage of DeepPeep attack model. In this
prediction stage, the inputs are Tp , EPF , BPt , FPt , Mf p, and percentage contribution of cuBLAS
kernels Gemv2T, Gemv2N and Gemmk1 (Table 4). The outputs of inter-group prediction stage are the
DNN groups listed in Table 3. We show the Tp and EPF values in Figure 6, andMf p and BPtF Pt ratio
in Figure 5. We experimentally demonstrate the variation of aforementioned metrics with the batch
size (B) on both P100 and P4000 GPUs.
Case 1: As described in Figure 8, when the combined contribution of Gemv2T and Gemv2N kernels
is very high, then it confirms the presence of DWConv with PWConv. Hence, the victim DNN
belongs to either the MobileNet group or the ShuffleNet group. In the MobileNet group, the majority
of operations are DWConv and PWConv, which lead to poor utilization of SM, and hence, Tp and
EPF remain constant even with higher B (Figure 6). By comparison, in the ShuffleNet group,
each layer has channel shuffling operation, which leads to better SM utilization compared to the
MobileNet group and the total percentage of Gemv2T and Gemv2N kernels is lower than DNNs in
MobileNet group (Table 4). Also, the percentage contribution of Gemmk1 kernel in DNNs of the
ShuffleNet group is significantly higher than that in DNNs of the MobileNet group. Due to this, for
ShuffleNet DNNs, with increasing B, initially Tp increases, and EPF decreases, but they plateau at
higher B.
Case 2: If total contribution of Gemv2T and Gemv2N kernels is lower than that in Case 1 and
the ratio BPtF Pt increases at higher B, then the victim DNN belongs either to SqueezeNext group or
DenseNet group. This has been explained in Appendix I and is illustrated in Figures 5(b) and 5(d).
Further, ifMf p increases exponentially with B, it confirms the presence of dense connections in
principle building block, and hence, the victim DNN belongs to the DenseNet group. By contrast,
if Mf p shows an only linear increase with increasing B, then it indicates that there are fewer
skip/residual connections, and the victim DNN belongs to the SqueezeNext group.
Case 3:When the combined contribution of all the three cuBLAS kernel Gemv2T, Gemv2N and
Gemmk1 is lower than 10%, then victim DNN belongs to either SqueezeNet or InceptionNet group.
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If the above-mentioned combined contribution is less than 1%, then the victim DNN is either
GoogLeNet or SqueezeNet.
By following the above steps, an adversary can easily predict the group of a DNN, especially
when the characteristics of the groups are very distinct, for example, MobileNet and DenseNet.
However, the characteristics of some groups such as SqueezeNet and InceptionNet, are quite similar,
and hence, more investigation is required for accurately distinguishing between them.
5.2 Intra-group Prediction
Once the group of a DNN is known, we further predict the exact DNN in the group, through
side-channel attacks. We choose one DNN in each group as the reference DNN (shown in bold
in Table 3). In the intra-group prediction stage of DeepPeep attack model, shown in Figure 9, we
compare the characteristics of the victim DNN with those of the reference DNN. Since DNNs in
most of the groups exhibit very distinct characteristics at a larger B, they are easily distinguishable
through side-channel attacks. Since the DenseNet group has only one DNN, there is no need to
perform intra-group prediction.
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Fig. 9. Intra-group prediction stage in DeepPeep predicts the exact DNN in the group
• MobileNet group: If EPF andTp of victim DNN is higher and lower (respectively) than that
of the reference DNN at all values of B, then victim DNN is MobileNet-V2 (Figures 6). Apart
from thses distinguishing performance metrics, Mf p is also a distinguishable factor here
because MobileNet-V2 has substantially higherMf p compared to MobileNet-V1 at higher B.
Reasoning: In the primary building block of MobileNet-V2, the DWConv layer is sandwiched
between two PWConv layers and has one residual connection [37]. These residual connections
increase concurrent activations. MobileNet-V2 is quite deeper than MobileNet-V1, which
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further increases the total concurrent activations and results in very highMf p in MobileNet-
V2. Also, this reduces effective activation reuse and increases energy consumption.
• ShuffleNet group: IfMf p of victim DNN is higher than that of the reference DNN at higher
B, then it is ShuffleNet-V2.
Reasoning: The only architectural difference between the building blocks of ShuffleNet-V1
and ShuffleNet-V2 is that unlike the former, the latter employed 1) group convolution in
1× 1 convolutional layers and 2) channel shuffling after the DWConv [31]. This architectural
difference leads to a difference between theirMf p , which is more pronounced at higher B.
• SqueezeNext group: If Mf p of victim DNN is very high compared to reference DNN at
higher B (such as B=28 or 56), (Figures 5(a) and 5(c)) and also the percentage of Gemv2N kernel
is lower than 5% then victim DNN is either 2.0-SqNxt-23 or 2.0-SqNxt-23v5. Otherwise, it
could be either 1.0-SqNxt-23v5 or 1.0-G-SqNxt-23. Further, if the combined contribution of
Gemv2T and Gemv2N kernels is lower than 30%, then victim DNN is 2.0-SqNxt-23v5, else it is
2.0-SqNxt-23 (Table 4). To distinguish between 1.0-SqNxt-23v5 and 1.0-G-SqNxt-23, we use
kernel side-channel attack which is used to predict the fine-grained architectural components
(Figure 7). If the percentage contribution of both Gemv2N and Gemmk1 kernel is higher than
that of the reference DNN, then it is 1.0-SqNxt-23v5, else, it is 1.0-G-SqNxt-23 (Table 4).
Reasoning: The v5 versions, 1.0-SqNxt-23v5 and 2.0-SqNxt-23v5, of SqueezeNext have a lower
number of groups with high ifmap resolution in the initial layers of networks and a higher
number of groups with low ifmap resolution in deeper layers [9]. Therefore, SM utilization
of v5 versions is better than their respective baseline models. Also, the percentage of Gemv2T
kernel is lower, while that of the Gemmk1 kernel is higher than their respective baseline.
Further, 2.0-SqNxt-23 and 2.0-SqNxt-23v5 have 2× number of filters per layer compared
to 1.0-SqNxt-23 and 1.0-SqNxt-23v5 respectively, and hence, theirMf p is larger and easily
distinguishable at higher B.
• SqueezeNet group: There are two distinguishing factors, EPF and Mf p for the DNNs be-
longing to this group. If EPF of victim DNN is lower than that of the reference DNN in this
group at all B then the victim DNN is SqueezeNet V1.1 (Figures 6(b) and 6(d)). Also, ifMf p of
victim DNN is lower than that of the reference DNN at all B then it confirms the presence of
SqueezeNet V1.1 (Figures 5(a) and 5(c)). These distinguishing factors become more evident at
higher B (such as B=28, 56).
Reasoning: The architectures of SqueezeNetV1.0 and SqueezeNetV1.1 are quite similar except
that V1.1 has a low dimensional filter in the first convolutional layer and uses down-sampling
earlier in layers. Downsampling in earlier layers reduces the intermediate feature map size,
which reduces bothMc andMf p and makes the network more energy-efficient.
• InceptionNet group: If the percentage contribution of Gemv2T kernel in victim DNN is
more than 1%, then it can be either Inception-V2 and SE-BN-Inception. However, since the
architectural difference between inception-V2 and SE-BN-Inception is negligible, side-channel
attacks are unable to further distinguish these two DNNs.
Reasoning: Except for GoogLeNet, other DNNs in this group have asymmetric filter decom-
position (AsymmFilterDecomp), which leads to a higher percentage of Gemv2T kernels. Thus,
GoogLeNet is easily distinguishable in this group. However, SE-BN-Inception uses very few
residual connections to employ feature recalibration, which increases the representational
power of the network. The small number of residual connections in SE-BN-Inception leads to
a small increase in the percentage contribution of Gemv2T kernel (Table 4). Therefore, perfor-
mance metrics of Inception-V2 and SE-BN-Inception are quite similar (Figures 5 and 6) and
hence, our side-channel attacks are unable to distinguish inception-V2 and SE-BN-Inception.
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6 DEFENSE MECHANISM
In sections 5.1 and section 5.2, we have seen how the distinctive characteristics of architectural
building blocks can be exploited to decipher the design methodologies of compact DNNs. We
observed that some architectures, such as the Dense block and DWConv, could be quite easily
predicted and hence have a high risk of IP theft. In this section, we propose some design guidelines
which circumvent the potential risk of design IP theft. We also study the parameter and computation
overheads of our secure design and demonstrate the implications for predictive performance (top-1
accuracy). Section 6.1 presents specific guidelines for DNNs that use DWConv, and Section 6.2
provides generic recommendations and guidelines for the security-aware design of DNNs.
6.1 Guidelines for DNNs with DWConv
Instead of DWConv, we employ group convolution in MobileNet-V1. Conventionally, in group
convolution, д remains constant in all the convolutional layers [48, 53]. By contrast, we employ
group convolution where the number of filter channels (д = MG ) remains constant in each group of
a convolutional layer. Note thatMc and data-reuse depend on д [18], and having the same д in all
the convolutional layers of DNNs can result in similar characteristics which can be exploited by
malicious entities to extract the design information. Moreover, compared to group convolution
with constant G, group convolution with constant д incurs significantly higher computational and
parameter overheads [18]. Hence, we employ group convolution with a constantG in MobileNet-V1,
where the value of д depends on the number of ifmaps (Table 9). We vary G from 1 to 32 and
measure the performance of each architecture in terms of FPt , BPt andMf p . Table 10 shows the
results. As shown in Table 10, increasing value of G increases the number of parameters and
computations;however, both FPt and BPt decrease with increasing G.
Table 9. Layers with depthwise convolution (DWConv) in MobileNet-V1
Convolutional layers Convolution types (ifmap, ofmap, # groups)
Conv2_1 DWConv (32, 32, 32G )
Conv2_2 DWConv (64, 64, 64G )
Conv3_1 DWConv (128, 128, 128G )
Conv3_2 DWConv (128, 128, 128G )
Conv4_1 DWConv (256, 256, 256G )
Conv4_2 DWConv (256, 256, 256G )
Conv5_1, Conv5_2, Conv5_3,
Conv5_4, Conv5_5, Conv5_6 DWConv 6 × (512, 512,
512
G )
Conv6 DWConv (1024, 1024, 1024G )
One of the distinctive properties of MobileNets, which makes it quite predictable in timing
side-channel attack, is the substantial difference between the FPt and BPt even at higher B (Figure
10). However, increasing G in MobileNet-V1 reduces the disparity between FPt and BPt (Table 10).
This happens because having a largerG reduces the fragmented memory accesses and increases the
data reuse, which reduces the latency of MAC operations. We select an optimum G as G=4, where
both the computational and parameter overheads are optimal along with the reasonable (layer-wise)
disparity between FPt and BPt . The lower disparity between FPt and BPt in MobileNet-V1 with
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G=4 makes the non-trivial to predict the architecture of building block through timing side-channel
attack. We call this version of MobileNet-V1 with G=4 as secure MobileNet-V1.
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Fig. 10. Variation in FPt and BPt time (measured on P100 GPU with B = 56) of all the layers with DWConv
in baseline MobileNet-V1 and secure MobileNet-V1 with G = 4
Table 10. Computation and parameter overhead of “secure MobileNet” over baseline MobileNet (measured
on P100 GPU with B=56)
G Increase inMc (%) Increase in P (%) FPt (ms) BPt (ms) Mf p (MB)
1 - - 1286 2143 7206
2 3.0 1.2 760 1297 7206
4 8.8 3.3 506 645 7206
8 19.4 7.3 285 493 7206
16 37.6 15.8 206 306 7204
32 64.2 32.9 174 213 7204
Performance implications of designing secure MobileNet-V1: Secure MobileNet-V1 has
only 8.8% and 3.3% additionalMc and P respectively, and compared to baselineMobileNet-V1 latency
is improved by 60.6% (Figure 10). Notice that changing G does not change Mf p . Furthermore,
we investigate the predictive performance implication of designing secure MobileNet-V1. We
trained baseline MobileNet-V1 and MobileNet-V1 with G = 4 on there image classification datasets
ImageNet-1K [36], CIFAR-100 [22] and Imagenette [1]. Results are shown in Table 11. The top-1
accuracy on two complex datasets ImageNet-1K and CIFAR-100, have increased by ≈2%. However,
on the easy dataset, Imagenette, the top-1 accuracy is improved by 0.8%. Increasing G increases
the number of channels in a group and captures more variations of a concept; thus, it boosts the
network’s representational power. This phenomenon is more pronounced in complex datasets
(such as ImageNet-1K and CIFAR-100), where capturing a higher number of variations improves
the predictive performance significantly. As a result, compared to Imagenette, the gain in accuracy
is higher on ImageNet-1K and CIFAR-100 dataset (Table 11).
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Table 11. Comparison of Top-1 accuracy (image classification) on ImageNet-1K, CIFAR-100, and Imagenette
datasets
DNN model ImageNet-1K (%) CIFAR-100 (%) Imagenette (%)
Baseline MobileNet-V1 (G=1) 70.60 67.44 84.12
Secure MobileNet-V1 (G=4) 72.24 69.15 84.92
6.2 Guidelines for any generic DNN
In this section, we present some other architectural heuristics, as generic recommendations, which
can be applied to thwart the side-channel attacks and enable robust DNNs. These design techniques
can be incorporated into a diverse set of DNNs.
1. Using a mixture of building blocks in DNN’s design: We have shown that (1) dense con-
nections in dense blocks lead to an exponential increase inMf p with increasing B, and (2) DWConv
lowers the computing resource utilization, which cannot be mitigated with higher B. Therefore, the
blocks showing completely different behavior with increasing B can be combined to thwart IP theft
through side-channel attacks. Compared to initial layers, deeper layers (layers towards output) have
more higher-dimensional semantic information and less positional information [25]; consequently,
a higher number of filters is required in deeper layers. Therefore, a secure version of compact DNNs
should use dense blocks in the deeper layers and improve the feature reuse, while DWConv in the
initial layers. These types of mixture building blocks in DNN reduce computational complexity and
boost the representational power using improved feature reuse. While the absence of distinctive
properties in DNNs makes it non-trivial to decipher the architecture through side-channel attacks.
Note that employing skip connects only in deeper layers could result in diminished predictive
performance. However, the lower number of skip connections leads to lowerMf p , and the network
can fit into the limited on-chip memory. This further reduces the data movements and improves
the energy-efficiency and throughput of the network.
2. Inclusion of sophisticated design heuristics in existing building blocks: Tomake intra-
group prediction difficult, design heuristics such as channel shuffling and filter recalibration can be
incorporated in the existing blocks, such as fire module. These heuristics do not significantly affect
the characteristics of building blocks in DNNs, but increase the representational power of the network.
This makes it more difficult to distinguish the DNNs with similar architecture.
Channel shuffling is employed after the group convolutional layer in DNN to blend the informa-
tion from different groups. This prevents information loss and hence the predictive performance.
However, channel shuffling is useful only up to a smaller value of д [53]. Therefore, increasing д
decreases the computational complexity and the number of parameters. However, beyond a specific
value of д, channel shuffling will not be effective in recovering the information loss across different
groups in the convolutional layers.
In summary, DNN designers need to employ different design heuristics for maximizing feature
reuse and data reuse (for better predictive performance and energy-efficiency, respectively) such
that the network does not exhibits distinctive characteristics. Hence, deciphering the architectural
components through side-channel attacks would become increasingly difficult for an adversary.
7 GENERALITY AND APPLICABILITY OF “DEEPPEEP”
In this section, we discuss and analyze the applicability of DeepPeep on other DNN architectures
(Section 7.1). We also describe the effect of datasets (inputs to the DNNs) on the efficacy of the
DeepPeep attack model (Section 7.2). Further, we discuss the generality of “DeepPeep” on other
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hardware platforms such as CPU and systolic-architecture based hardware accelerators (Section
7.3).
7.1 Applicability on Other DNN Architectures
Here, we seek to answer the following questions.Does our attack consider all the existing architectures
in (manually designed) compact DNNs? Further, is DeepPeep applicable to the compact DNNs designed
through an automated process such as neural architecture search (NAS)?
There are two broad strategies for designing compact DNNs. The first strategy seeks to signifi-
cantly reduce the computational complexity and/or the number of parameters with a negligible loss
in predictive performance. Examples of this strategy include DWConv in MobileNet and ShuffleNet
variants, and fire module in SqueezeNet and SqueezeNext variants. The second strategy boosts the
representational power of DNNs in a fixed budget of MAC operations and the number of parameters.
The representational power of DNNs is improved either by improving feature reuse or through
multi-scale feature learning. DNNs employ residual connections (element-wise addition) and skip
connections (concatenation of fmaps from previous layers) to improve the feature reuse [25]. Resid-
ual connections have been implemented in an aggressive version of the fire module, which forms
the building blocks of SqueezeNext variants [9]. Skip connections have been implemented in the
dense blocks of DenseNet [15]. Evidently, the compact DNNs used in our experiments (Table 3) are
employed all the commonly used design heuristics in the architecture of building blocks. Besides,
we have included compact DNNs that use design techniques, such as channel shuffling, which are
not commonly used in the design of compact DNNs. In summary, the compact DNNs used in our
experiments (Table 3) employ an extensive set of design heuristics, and hence, they are a good
representative of state-of-the-art compact DNNs.
In the automated design process such as NAS, normal and reduction cells are repeatedly stacked
(alternatively) in a steam-lined fashion [55]. An optimization algorithm selects the architectural
components of these cells over a large search space of design heuristics. This search space includes:
convolution, depthwise-separable convolution, max/avg-pooling, asymmetrical filter decomposition
with different filter size, identity connections such as residual/skip connections, etc. [55]. Since our
attack model “DeepPeep” is a bottom-up approach that first predicts the fine-grained architectural
components and then predicts the building blocks in DNNs, it can predict the normal/reduction cell
in the DNN designed through NAS. In summary, the attack methodologies in “DeepPeep” are quite
generalized and applicable to any DNN formed by repeated stacking of a building block. Hence,
DeepPeep can also work on compact DNNs designed using NAS.
7.2 Applicability on different Datasets
In the adversarial attacks [10], input pixels are intelligently manipulated in a manner that is
imperceptible to the human, to change the output prediction. By contrast, “DeepPeep” is entirely
based on the side-channel attacks. Consequently, the input pixel values or the input dataset’s
complexity do not affect any intermediate steps in inter-group and intra-group prediction. Changing
the spatial size of input frame, for instance 224 × 224 in ImageNet-1K vs. 32 × 32 in CIFAR-100,
would change the absolute values of Mf p , FPt , BPt , Tp , and EPF . However, the relative trend of
these performance metrics with different B would remain the same. Thus, we do not need to adapt
the intermediate steps in inter-group and intra-group algorithms, and hence “DeepPeep” attack
model is independent of the input dataset.
7.3 Applicability on Other Hardware Platforms
We have conducted experiments on two GPUs, P4000 and P100, to show whether the distinctive
characteristics of various architectural components in DNNs are consistent over GPUs with different
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configurations. As shown in Figure 5 and Figure 6, the absolute values of Mf p , FPt , BPt , Tp , and
EPF are different on different GPUs. However, the trends in their variation with different B are
consistent across these GPUs. The intermediate steps in both inter-group and intra-group prediction
depends on the aforementioned trends with different B (Figure 8 and 9). Moreover, the prediction of
fine-grained architectural ingredients of building blocks (Figure 7), which serves as an intermediate
step in both inter-group and intra-group prediction, depends entirely on the percentage of cuBLAS
kernels. Hence, our proposed attack method is GPU-agnostic.
On CPU, DNN inference heavily relies on the tiled GEMM kernel, and an adversary can exploit
this relationship to gain insights into the DNN architecture [51]. On GPUs, the hardware utilization
is observed based on the percentages of three cuBLAS kernels Gemv2T, Gemv2N, and Gemmk1. On
CPUs, a different set of kernels need to be observed for finding the hardware utilization. These
kernels depend on the library used, e.g., Intel MKL-DNN. Hence, to use the “DeepPeep” attack model
on CPU, we need to adapt the intermediate steps in both inter-group and intra-group prediction.
Similarly, on systolic-array based DNN accelerators, the percentage of PE (processing element)
utilizations can be used as an intermediate step in the “DeepPeep” attack algorithm. However, this
information may be insufficient to decipher all the fine-grained architectural ingredients in principle
building block. We believe that we need to change the intermediate steps in both inter-group and
intra-group algorithms to use “DeepPeep” on the systolic accelerators.
8 REASONS FOR HUMAN-OBSERVATION BASED APPROACH IN “DEEPPEEP”
Unlike the machine learning-based approach, “DeepPeep" is a human observation based attack
model where the insights obtained from the correlation between architectural components and
their performance implications have been exploited to reverse engineer the architecture of compact
DNNs. Therefore, the steps used in deciphering fine-grained architectural components (Figure
7) have been used as intermediate steps in both stages Inter-group and Intra-group prediction
in “DeepPeep". The reasons for preferring a human-observation based approach over a machine
learning-based approach is threefold.
1. Problem structure: Unlike a simple composite function or a sequence-based function, the
“DeepPeep" algorithm is a relational reasoning problem where the intermediate steps in Figure
7, Figure 8, and Figure 9 resembles nodes in a tree/graph. Hence, a simple feed-forward neural
network (MLP or CNN) or RNNwould not generalize well over such a problem. For (sample efficient)
generalization, the computational graph of the network should very-well align with the structure
of the relational reasoning problem [50]. Therefore, a more structured graph neural network (GNN)
would be an appropriate algorithm. However, the current understanding of the relationship between
generalization ability and structure for reasoning is quite limited [50].
2. Sample size: Neural networks require a huge dataset to learn and develop the experience.
Transfer learning can mitigate this issue; however, it is limited to only correlated problems. That is,
neural networks are quite inefficient, as compared to a human, to find the relationship between
entirely different experiences. As shown in Table 3, we have very few data points (DNNs) for each
fine-grained architectural components and building blocks.
3. Lack of reasoning: One of the crucial shortcomings of the neural network is a lack of reasoning.
Note that in the “DeepPeep" attack, we reverse engineer the architecture of compact DNNs using
the information obtained from side-channel attacks. Hence, a human-based approach is preferred
for such tasks with very-limited data points.
9 RELATEDWORK
Related work on deciphering DNN architecture: Liu et al. [27], investigate the security chal-
lenges in model compression. Liu et al. [28] expose security vulnerabilities through the Trojan
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attacks. Hua et al. [14] exploit the memory access pattern to decipher the architecture of AlexNet
and SqueezeNet on a hardware accelerator. Yan et al. [51] use Gemm library calls and dimensions of
matrices in Gemm for extracting the model information. They performed experiments on VGG and
ResNet. However, these studies perform experiments on a limited set of DNNs with simple architec-
tures; they have not shown the effectiveness of their technique on complex design methodologies,
such as DWConv, channel shuffling, dense connections. Also, some of these methods require
privileged access to the hardware/software. Unlike the aforementioned works, we investigate the
security implication of designing compact DNNs and show the feasibility of design IP theft. In our
experimental evaluation, we include DNNs with complex architecture such as MobileNet variants
(DWConv), DenseNet (dense connections), ShuffleNet variants (DWConv and channel shuffling).
Moreover, our attack methodology “DeepPeep" uses side-channel attacks along with cuBLAS kernel
analysis and hence, does not require privileged access.
Related work on IP protection: Rouhani et al. [35] proposed a technique for enabling end-
to-end IP protection of DNNs using a digital watermark. Tramer et al. [42] proposed a trusted
execution environment for DNN inference to ensure integrity and privacy. However, they did
not address the model’s privacy, and the effectiveness of their technique during the training has
not been proven. Also, these works are orthogonal to our work and can be integrated with our
techniques.
10 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
In this paper, we study the ramifications of design heuristics employed in state-of-the-art compact
DNNs and show how these ramifications can be exploited by malicious entities to decipher the
design methods incorporated in DNN and steal the design IP. We show how some design methods,
such as dense connections and DWConv, are quite easy to decipher because of their unique
characteristics. We propose a novel and lightweight design guidelines for preventing information
leakage in secure DNNs.
Future work:We plan to modify the “DeepPeep” such that we can also predict the architecture
of a DNN, which does not have a regular stack of similar building blocks. Also, the networks
generated through random network generator [49] have irregularity in terms of skip connections.
Predicting the architecture of such an irregular network is quite challenging. In addition, we plan to
incorporate the intermediate steps such that the number of convolutional layers, shape, and size of
filters in convolutional layers can also be accurately predicted. Furthermore, the information about
processing-element (PE) utilization and the number of systolic array calls during the execution of a
DNN on the systolic array-based processor can be incorporated in the inter-group and intra-group
prediction algorithms. This will make “DeepPeep” efficacious on all the systolic array-based DNN
accelerators.
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I MINIBATCH STOCHASTIC GRADIENT DESCENT
Here we explain the reason for the substantial difference between FPt and BPt when DWConv is
employed in the design of compact DNNs (Figure 10). We also explain why with higher B, the ratio
BPt
F Pt
increases in SqueezeNext but remains constant in MobileNet and ShuffleNet.
In Figure 11, x is input, y ′ is predicted output during forward pass, ln is the n-th layer in the
network. Whereas hn and δn are the activation (in forward pass) and error-term (in backward
pass) of n-th layer in network. LetW n be the parameters of n-th layer and J (W ,b;x ,y) be the cost
function of network. b is the bias term and y is the actual label of input training sample.
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Fig. 11. Forward pass and backward pass during the training of DNN using mini-batch SGD with batch size B
.
In forward pass, y ′ is calculated as follows:
hi = f (hTi−1Wi ) (6)
y ′ = so f tmax(hTn−1Wn) (7)
In the case of a convolutional layer, n is the index of the convolutional layer, and j is the filter
index within a convolutional layer. During backward pass error term and filter weights are updated
as follows.
δ ij =
(
(W ij )T δ (i+1)j
)
⊙ f ′(hij ) (8)
W ij =W
i
j − ηhTi−1δi (Weight update equation) (9)
During the forward pass (Equations 6 and 7), weight matrixW is beingmultiplied with activations;
whereas, during the backward pass, the transpose of weight matrix (W ij )T is being multiplied with
the error-term (Equation 8). Therefore, the effect of Gemv2T and Gemv2N kernels get inter-changed
during backward pass. That is, in forward pass higher percentage of Gemv2N kernel is the main source
for SM under-utilization, while, in backward pass, it is a higher percentage of Gemv2N kernel.
As shown in Figure 10, there is substantial difference between layer-wise BPt and FPt in
MobileNet-V1, because the contribution of both Gemv2T and Gemv2N kernels are very high (Table
4). In case of SqueezeNext, the higher percentage of Gemv2T(Table 4) led to higher rate of increase
in BPt with B compared to the FPt with higher B (because there is lower percentage of Gemv2N).
Therefore, for SqueezeNext variants, BPtF Pt ratio increases with batch size B (Figure 5(b) and 5(d)).
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